Theodoros Kolokotronis, implementing the organizational plan of the Greek rebels, attempted and succeeded in reconciling the Mani families who were feuding with each other on March 22, 1821, together with Petrombei Mavromichalis, Papaflessas, Kapetanakis, Koudourakis, Nikitaras Anagnostaras, and the Maniate warlords, he headed for Kalamata.
The next day, the city surrendered to the Greek revolutionary forces, and Kolokotronis and Papaflessas advanced towards Arcadia. As soon as the revolutionary movement broke out, the Ottomans in the Peloponnese were forced to retreat to the fortresses on the Peloponnese coast. Patras, Nafplio, Monemvasia, Neokastro, Methoni, and Koroni. A dilemma arose as to how the operations would be conducted. Most revolutionary military and political leaders believed that these castles were the targets that should be attacked immediately. Kolokotronis, unlike the others, was almost the only one who supported this view, believing that a centralized military plan targeting exclusively Tripolitsa, the administrative and military center, would bring multiple benefits to the progress of the revolution. He believed that the option of capturing the regional forts would lead to a division of the revolutionary forces, multi-command, and a loss of time, which would allow the Ottoman authorities to reinforce Tripolitsa.
Consequently, the systematic layout and fortification of the Greek camp for the siege of Tripolitsa was the sole responsibility of Theodoros Kolokotronis. Despite the difficulties and minor setbacks of the early days, Kolokotronis would contribute decisively to the success of the Greek revolutionary forces at Valtetsi on May 12-13, 1821. Meanwhile, Mustafa Pasha, who had been detached from the mainland front, headed for the besieged Tripolitsa. He defeated the siege of Patras, Acrocorinth, and Nafplio, and attempted to do the same in Tripolitsa. However, the fierce resistance of the Maniots in Valtetsi gave Kolokotronis, Plapoutas, and the other leaders the opportunity to surround the enemy forces and force them to retreat. The battle was significant because it boosted the confidence of the Greek rebels and prevented the forces besieging Tripolitsa from breaking through. Equally important was the battle of Grana, where an sortie by the besieged Ottomans on August 10, 1821, ended in a great victory for the revolutionary forces and once again demonstrated Kolokotronis’ strategic abilities.
After six months, the efforts of Theodoros Kolokotronis and the other rebels finally led to the fall of Tripolitsa on September 23. The fall of Tripolitsa was decisive for the consolidation and expansion of the revolutionary movement, as it allowed the rebels to gain operational space and freed up the field for political organization. It also gave them the strength and courage to continue the struggle and equipped them with the necessary supplies and weapons that were obtained as spoils of the siege.
After the Ottoman power structures were overthrown, the power vacuum that was created put the political relations of the rebels to the test, as it brought to the fore the opposition of local notables to the choices of Dimitrios Ypsilantis, who had arrived in the Peloponnese in early June. The leaders did not respond positively to Ypsilantis’ proposals and plans for the political organization of the revolution, especially when they learned of the tragic outcome of the movement in the Danubian principalities, and great tension arose among the protagonists. Kolokotronis’ intervention prevented the escalation of tension and defused the crisis that would have tested the unity of the revolutionaries, while there was also an initial agreement between Ypsilantis and the notables on the methodology of political developments.
Nevertheless, Ypsilantis faced the first consequences of this confrontation when, at the first national assembly in Epidaurus in December 1821-January 1822, he suffered a political defeat after finding himself on the sidelines of developments. Obviously, it was not only the elders who claimed participation in power for themselves, but also the new protagonists, the newly arrived Phanariots and intellectuals, as well as Theodoros Kolokotronis, who gained social and political prestige through his victories. It was no coincidence, then, that Dimitrios Ypsilantis lost his influence in the military party to Kolokotronis, who began to emerge as a new authoritative figure demanding a share in the organization of the revolutionary society and the conduct of the war. society and the direction of the war.
In early 1822, the rebels decided to resume the siege of Patras. The government entrusted Kolokotronis with the leadership of the siege, even though it was concerned about the opportunity this gave the commander-in-chief to further increase his prestige and, by extension, his influence.
At the same time, the danger to the revolution arose from Mahmut Pasha of Larissa, known as “Dramalis,” who organized a new large-scale campaign to suppress the revolution in the Peloponnese. Kolokotronis’ political opponents attempted to exploit this situation to remove him from Patras. To this end, the administration issued an order for him to head for Roumeli, an order which Kolokotronis refused to carry out. His disobedience to the administration’s call was indicative of the power he had begun to acquire and the influence he exerted over military leaders and armed men. So Kolokotronis went to Corinth with a section of his armed men, and this pressure on the administration and his armed negotiation once again earned him the leadership of the siege of Patras.
However, Kolokotronis later considered that without financial assistance and a lack of adequate supplies for the camp, there was no longer any point in remaining in Achaea, and on June 23, 1822, he broke off the siege and left for Gastouni. Dramalis crossed over to the Peloponnese without encountering any resistance and captured Corinth on July 6, 1822, and Argos on July 12. At these critical moments, Kolokotronis demonstrated his strategic mind at a meeting of military leaders held in Achladokampos on July 10, proposing the occupation of key locations in order to isolate Dramalis in Argolis.
Kolokotronis realized that Dramalis had no intention of advancing towards Tripolitsa, and his plan was based on the terrible heat and drought that prevailed at the time, conditions that contributed to Dramalis’ inability to advance without further supplies. supplies. Kolokotronis then, together with his commanders, took up strategic positions and on July 26 blocked Dervenakia, where most of the Ottoman army was located on its way back to Corinth. The Ottoman forces were completely destroyed, and Dramalis barely managed to escape to Corinth.
Kolokotronis’ successes on the military front showed that the revolution was on the right track, while on the political front the internal crisis intensified, with the fundamental issue being that of power.
The second national assembly in Astros in March 1823 failed to restore political calm, and the climate of confrontation did not subside with the revision of the constitution. The second national assembly found the Moraiotes dominating the administration. To achieve this, they weakened Mavrokordatos and neutralized Aigle and Ypsilantis the administration’s refusal to recognize the Peloponnesian Senate’s appointment of Kolokotronis as commander-in-chief
After the fall of Tripolitsa, it sparked a major crisis and disputes between the legislative and executive bodies. The National Assembly appointed Petrombei Mavromichalis as president of the executive branch and, shortly thereafter, Theodoros Kolokotronis as vice president. From that moment on, Kolokotronis ceased to appear solely as a military leader of the revolution, but also acted as a politician. In the new conditions created by the war, he became a new center of power, attracting most of the military leaders and those who were dissatisfied with the choices made by the administration. To strengthen and expand his personal homeland, Kolokotronis betrothed his young son Kallinos to Maria, daughter of Kanellos Deligiannis.
Things took a more critical turn when Alexandros Mavrokordatos was elected president of the parliament and became secretary-general of the executive. Kolokotronis saw this election as a new threat to his interests and sent his son Panos to bring him back into line. Mavrokordatos resigned from his position, and in November 1823, things escalated further when Kolokotronis and Petrombei Mavromichalis expelled the politicians from Nafplio and attempted to form their own administration.
On the other hand, the parliament headed to Kranidi and asked for protection from the people of Hydra. Finally, he appointed a new executive with new members, Panagiotis Botasis of Kountouriotis and Nikos Londos, who became the first president. So the phenomenon of there being two governments appeared, one in Tripoli with Petrobeis and Kolokotronis and one in Kranidi with Mavrokordatos and Kountouriotis, and one challenging the other.
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